

**Resolution in Support of Election Integrity**

**WHEREAS** free and fair elections in which every vote is counted according to the voter's intent are a vital component of a representative form of democracy; and

**WHEREAS** constant performance auditing of both records and complex equipment is standard operating procedure for both business and research enterprises, though not currently for elections departments; and

**WHEREAS** there is currently no national standard for mandatory auditing of vote tabulation equipment; and

**WHEREAS** the notion that any private company should own voter registration data and election results data is an assault on the very meaning of public representative democracy; and

**WHEREAS** the 2004 gubernatorial race results were not recounted in Snohomish county because the data was proprietary, because there was no independent voter verifiable record of ballots cast, and because there were many registered complaints from voters attempting to vote for Gregoire and having their votes switched to Rossi (though there were no complaints about voters attempting to vote for Rossi and being switched to the Libertarian candidate Bennett); and

**WHEREAS** in 2004 tabulated complaints about machine malfunctions showed that 98% were complaints about attempting to vote for Kerry and having the vote switched to Bush; and

**WHEREAS** in 2006 Minnesota successfully implemented a mandatory auditing system for its optically scanned paper ballots; and

**WHEREAS** in the words of computer security expert David Dill "It is not enough that elections BE accurate; we have to KNOW that they are accurate, and we don't";

**THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED** the use of proprietary software be eliminated and replaced by open source software developed by a public consortium; and

**THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that direct electronic recording of votes (DRE) be banned nationally (though the use of touchscreens is acceptable if they are one of several possible interfaces for the production of voter verified paper ballots which are tabulated separately); and

**THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that a mandatory system like that currently in use by Minnesota for auditing optical scanning machines by random hand counts be required nationally; and

**THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that paper ballots must be the legal ballots of record; and

**THEREFORE BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED** that current systems for paper ballot duplication in the event of rejection by centralized optical scanning machines be retained, and not replaced by electronic images which, when altered, eliminate the original data.

Submitted to the \_\_\_\_\_ precinct caucus by \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_

Approved by \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.

55 **References and additional information**

56  
57 <http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2005/1529>

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59 Among other things, the GAO confirms that:

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61 1. Some electronic voting machines "did not encrypt cast ballots or system audit logs, thus making it possible to  
62 alter them without detection." In other words, the GAO now confirms that electronic voting machines provided an  
63 open door to flip an entire vote count. More than 800,000 votes were cast in Ohio on electronic voting machines,  
64 some seven times Bush's official margin of victory.

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66 2. "It is easy to alter a file defining how a ballot appears, making it possible for someone to vote for one candidate  
67 and actually be recorded as voting for an entirely different candidate." Numerous sworn statements and affidavits  
68 assert that this did happen in Ohio 2004.

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70 3. "Falsifying election results without leaving any evidence of such an action by using altered memory cards" can  
71 easily be done, according to the GAO.

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73 <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0608/S00220.htm>

74 *by Michael Collins ("Scoop" Independent Media)*

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76 A recent Zogby poll documents ground breaking information on the attitudes of American voters toward electronic voting.  
77 They are quite clear in the belief that the outcome of an entire election can be changed due to flaws in computerized voting  
78 machines. At a stunning rate of 92%, Americans insist on the right to watch their votes being counted. And, at an  
79 overwhelming 80%, they strongly object to the use of secret computer software to tabulate votes without citizen access to that  
80 software.

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82 The American public is clear in its desire for free, fair, and transparent elections. An 80%-90% consensus on the right to view  
83 vote counting and opposition to secrecy by voting machine vendor is both rare and remarkable in American politics. If only  
84 the public knew that these options are virtually non-existent in today's election system.

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86 Most all likely voters (92%) agree that citizens have the right to view and obtain information about how election officials'  
87 count votes (Statement A). Just 6% feel citizens do not have this right (Statement B).

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89 Four fifths of respondents within every demographic group selected the right for citizen review and access, Statement A. This  
90 includes overwhelming majorities of both Kerry (92.8%) and Bush supporters (90.8%); independents (96.9%); Catholics  
91 (92.8%), Protestants (90.8%), Jews (87.2%), and those with no religious affiliation (93.3%); and two points above the  
92 average, NASCAR fans, 93.9%.

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95 [http://ceimn.org/news/minnesota\\_performs\\_first\\_post\\_election\\_review](http://ceimn.org/news/minnesota_performs_first_post_election_review)

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97 We have a really good system in place in Minnesota. We have a 100 percent paper-ballot system. But even with these devices  
98 the only way to be confident in their security and reliability is to check them out," Hilty stated.

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100 Depending on the number of registered voters in a county, two to four precincts per jurisdiction must be randomly selected  
101 for auditing. Hilty said he wants to fine-tune the law during the next legislative session by requiring larger-population  
102 counties to audit more precincts.

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104 Congressional, presidential and gubernatorial races are examined. Local election officials and election judges perform the  
105 check, hand-counting the paper ballots and comparing them with the optical-scan tabulation results.

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107 The comparison is required to be accurate to within one-half of 1 percent and if it is not, more precincts are reviewed.

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110 **Added remarks by precinct caucus attendees**